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In this, the 273rd volume in Oxford University Press’ popular Very Short Introduction 
series, Paul Strohm, Professor of Humanities at Columbia University, takes a broadly 
historical and literary approach in his examination of conscience. Nevertheless, his 
approach is of considerable importance to bioethicists since issues of conscience 
and conscientious objection remain at the heart of many ethical debates. Even the 
most ardent advocates of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide, for example, 
recognize that conscience clauses would have to be a necessary element of any 
proposals to changes in the law to permit such actions in the UK. And the decreasing 
number of doctors prepared to carry out abortions and therefore exercising their 
right of conscientious objection not to do so, is currently causing much concern to 
abortion providers in Britain. 
 In 2006, the British Medical Journal commissioned Oxford’s Professor Julian 
Savulescu to write a controversial article on conscience in which he stated his 
view that “a doctor’s conscience has little place in the delivery of modern medical 
care.” However since then, issues of conscience appear much more rather than less 
prominently featured in both healthcare debates and medico-legal cases. Strohm’s 
concise but varied exploration of conscience in this volume leads him to conclude 
“we are far better off with conscience than without it” (p. 2) and he explains why 
the phenomenon is not so easy to eliminate from our ethical discourse. 
 The word “phenomenon” is chosen carefully as Strohm considers defining con-
science other than in phenomenological language is almost impossible and so he 
offers instead what he calls a “cultural geography” of conscience (p. 3), though he 
concentrates principally on Western civilizations.
 In the first century BC, both Julius Caesar and Cicero wrote about conscience, the 
latter in Pro Milo describing it as the principal “theatre of virtue” (theatrum virtuti) 
in which we perform for good or ill. However, Strohm sees the subsequent Christian 
appropriation of conscience as the major shaping factor of Western consciences 
and in particular, Jerome’s choice in the late fourth century of the word conscientia 
for the Greek “syneidesis,” in his Latin translation of the New Testament from 
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Greek. Whereas syneidesis referred solely to an internal quality, conscientia also 
incorporated an element of external reference to the law and public opinion and 
thus straddled the inner and outer aspects of human nature. Since, in the medieval 
period, the outer world was largely shaped by the Catholic Church, conscience had 
a stabilizing effect, as “it was furnished with a secure body of content in the form of 
Christian theology” (p. 11).
 The more contemporary concept of the solitary conscience standing alone against 
accepted authority was foreshadowed to some extent in Langland’s fourteenth-
century poem, Piers Plowman. However, Strohm interestingly associates this 
transformation of conscience primarily with Martin Luther. His 1521 declaration 
that his conscience was subject only to the words of God as revealed in the Bible, 
marked the rise of the Reformation conscience, bound by the individual’s response 
to God rather than shaped by the institutional Church. 
 Thus Strohm considers that, paradoxically, it was Luther and John Calvin, rather 
than Enlightenment philosophers who were responsible for the secularization of 
conscience during the seventeenth century. “The Reformation conscience…main-
taining an inherently solitary vigil…often found itself in the position of a lonely spy, 
parachuted into enemy territory with a shortwave radio and a dying battery, awaiting 
a message that might never come”(p. 27). Indeed Strohm suggests that not only the 
Peasant’s War in 1525, but the seventeenth-century English Civil Wars also have 
these contending views of conscience at their heart. 
 Ironically it was John Locke, a Puritan physician, whose father was one of 
the Parliamentary force commanders during the Civil War, who became the first 
philosopher of the Enlightenment to denounce the conscience of the Reformed 
believer as being “nothing but the strength of his own persuasion.” Though Locke 
was himself a believer in divine illumination, he maintained that reason, rather 
than personal revelation, should be the arbiter of the legitimacy of conscience. 
Conscience could not be its own authority “since some men with the same bent of 
conscience, prosecute what others avoid.”
 Yet unaided reason also remains vulnerable to error or self-interest and it is the 
eighteenth-century philosophers Emmanuel Kant and Adam Smith who turn to what 
is, according to Strohm, essentially a social consensus as a grounding for conscience. 
Smith anticipates Kant (and Rawls) in his 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments in 
suggesting that “We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any 
other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.” Kant’s 1797 Metaphysics of 
Morals considers conscience as conducting “an inner court” in man but being wholly 
internal, it cannot objectively judge itself. Kant’s solution was that “all duties of a 
man’s conscience will…have to think of someone other than himself…as the judge 
of his actions, if conscience is not to be in contradiction with itself.” 
 However, Strohm points out that with secular consensus filling the void of 
rejected revelation, conscience is now left at the mercy of unquestioned external 
public opinion and how this is totally at odds with the modern concept of “prisoners 
of conscience,” unjustly imprisoned for opposing what the rest of society thinks. 
The ascendency of this latter view of conscience, Strohm attributes primarily to 
John Stuart Mill who in his Essay on Liberty (1859) wrote that liberty consists of 
“first the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in the 
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most comprehensive sense.” Thus, Mill argues that “the contents of an emancipated 
conscience” are provided neither by divine revelation, state dictats or social 
consensus but rather are a matter for the single individual. Conscience seems to 
have thus turned full circle, back to a secularized version of Calvin’s Reformed 
individual’s conscience.
 Strohm next asks if conscientious objection should be a civil right? He first considers 
conscientious objection to military service to conclude that Western societies have, 
overall, been willing to accommodate, rather than punish, conscientious objectors to 
participation in active warfare. He then turns his attention to the bioethical question 
of healthcare professionals and conscientious objection. Taking as his examples the 
2010 cases of Massachusetts pharmacists refusing to dispense “morning after” pills 
and UK Relate counsellor, Gary McFarlane’s conscientious objection to providing 
sex therapy to homosexuals, Strohm maintains that, just as in the case of pacifists, 
Western society considers “some deference is owed to persons of religious or moral 
scruple, so long as (it) does not compromise the right of patients to safe and prompt 
treatment” (p. 83).
 Strohm then further explores the implications of the 1948 UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights that “Everyone has the right to freedom of religion, 
conscience and thought” in the light of such areas as global cultural diversity and 
the fact that, however well intended, conscience can get it badly wrong, as the 
self–professed “good” conscience of most Nazis readily attests. This last example, 
however, does rather undermine Strohm’s suggestion that “personal conscience 
works best when it finds some point of attachment with shared belief” (p. 91), though 
he does acknowledge there are problems inherent in his suggested “resolution.”
 Many bioethicists may feel very uncomfortable by Strohm’s analysis but few 
can question his conclusion that one of the key elements of conscience that makes 
it inherently controversial is that it is “crucially active in…persuading oneself not 
merely to entertain convictions but to act in matters of conviction. At its best and 
most successful, conscience not only drives or activates the desire to refine belief 
but also translates belief into action and engagement” (p. 92; emphasis mine).
